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LIMITING THE FRANCHISOR'S POWER TO WITHHOLD
CONSENT TO A TRANSFER BY THE FRANCHISEE
Jones operates a retail outlet for XYZ, Inc., under a
franchise agreement. Jones, wishing to retire from business,
finds a reputable businessman, Smith, who is willing to buy
the franchise for 50,ooo dollars, a price considered by both
parties to be the fair market value of the franchise. Since the
franchise agreement requires Jones to secure the consent of
XYZ before making any transfer of the franchise, Jones
notifies his franchisor of Smith's offer and requests consent
for the transfer. After informing Jones that his request to
transfer will be duly considered, XYZ informs Brown that it
has a franchise which he might purchase for 25,ooo dollars.
Brown, realizing his good fortune, agrees to purchase the fran-
chise. Thereafter, XYZ informs Jones that it will not con-
sent to his proposed transfer to Smith, but would be willing
to permit the transfer of the franchise to Brown for 25,000
dollars. XYZ realizes that the less Brown pays for the fran-
chise, the more Brown will have for further investments in the
franchise. In turn, the franchise will become more profitable
both for the franchisor and for the new franchisee.
This fact situation illustrates a serious problem in the franchisor-
franchisee relationship. The franchisee usually has a sizable investment in
the business. This investment, however, may be jeopardized if the
franchisor retains control over any subsequent transfer of the franchise.
Indeed, most franchise agreements contain such a "consent to transfer"
clause.1 Although not inherently unfair, such clauses have resulted in
serious problems because of the lack of standards governing their use.
FRANCHISES AND THENEED FOR CONTROLS
Basically, a franchise is a license from the owner of a trademark or
trade name permitting another to sell a product or service under that
name or mark.2 The Lanham Act,3 which permits such licensing,
1. H. BROWN, FRA CHSING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTiNG 25 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as BROWN].
2. H. KuasH, THE FkAcHsE Boom 4 (1968).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970).
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requires that the licensee be a "related person or company." 4 To be
considered "related," the licensee must be controlled by the licensor with
respect to the nature and quality of the goods and services on which the
trademark is used.5 It is insufficient for the licensor merely to reserve
the right to control the quality and use of the goods and services. The
franchisor has the affirmative duty of exercising, in a reasonable
manner,' those controls which will guarantee that third parties will
receive goods or services of the quality which they have learned to
associate with that trademark.7 Thus, the franchisor is mandated by
the Act to maintain some degree of control over his franchisee.
The policy behind the Lanham Act also serves to justify the consent
clause. The franchisor should have the power to reject any prospective
transferee who is not competent to protect the franchisor's trademark
and investment. Nevertheless, the control exerted by the consent clause
bears heavily on the rights of the franchisee. For example, a donut shop
franchisee is required to purchase equipment which can only be used to
make donuts.8 Therefore, if the franchisee wishes to convey the business
but cannot obtain the franchisor's consent, his offly realistic option is to
continue in business under the franchisor's trademark. Since most
franchise agreements contain a covenant not to compete," the franchisee
will be unable to utilize the equipment in a nonfranchised enterprise.
Even if specialized equipment is not involved, the franchisee is unable to
sell the business in which he has invested a great deal of time and
money."0 This note explores various judicial and legislative approaches
which might be employed, in the consent clause context, to balance the
interests of franchisors and franchisees.
JUDICIAL POSSIBILITIES
The only reported case in which a consent clause has been directly
considered is Bidwell v. Long.1 In that case, the Appellate Divsion of
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
6. Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir.
1959); R.C.W., Supervisor, Inc. v. Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F. Supp. 453, 461
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
7. Axelrod, Franchising-Changing Legal Skirmish Lines or Armageddon, 26
Bus. L. REv. 699 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Axelrod].
8. See R. ROSENBERG, PROFITS FROMi FRANCHISING 260 (1969).
9. Id. at 108, 251.
10. The two situations where he may not recoup money invested in the franchise
are: (1) when the franchisor makes a blanket denial, refusing to consider any
prospective transferee; (2) when the franchisor refuses transfer to the only pro-
spective transferee in the market.
11. 14 App. Div. 2d 168, 218 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1961). Defendant, a Pepperidge
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the New York Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that a licensor, whose
franchise agreement contained a consent clause, was at least bound to
entertain the licensee's application for transfer and "was not free to
withhold approval capriciously or arbitrarily."' 2 Such a result seems
desirable, but Bidwell laid no theoretical groundwork for it. There are
three possible judicial solutions to the consent clause problem.
Initially, the franchisor-franchisee relationship can be characterized
as a "hybrid" fiduciary one. Secondly, a standard of reasonableness
could be read into the consent clause when another standard is not
specifically stated. Finally, franchisor control could be restricted under an
antitrust analysis.
Fiduciary Relationship
Certain characteristics peculiar to the franchising system indicate
that the franchisor-franchisee relationship may be of a fiduciary nature.
One of these characteristics is the great disparity in the bargaining
position and expertise of the parties.'2 The Utah Supreme Court, in
Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., 4 described this disparity:
[Franchise contracts] are almost always drawn up by the
franchiser and are presented to a dealer or agent for acceptance
and signature, rather than for negotiation as to terms. They also
invariably provide for ample protection to the rights of the
franchiser .... "
Trust, an essential element of any fiduciary relationship, 6 is clearly
present in the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
The franchisor inculcates the franchisee with the necessity of
being taught, guided, and controlled not only during the
initial training period, but throughout the existence of the
Farm franchisee, contracted with plaintiff to transfer his interest in the franchise to
plaintiff. Defendant later advised plaintiff that he would not go through with the
sale. Defendant argued that he was not liable since his franchise agreement with
Pepperidge Farm stated that any sale of the franchise without the written approval
of Pepperidge Farm was void. The court held, however, that the provision of the
franchise agreement was for the benefit of Pepperidge Farm and afforded no defense
to the action and, consequently, awarded specific performance of the contract and.
depreciation damages.
12. Id. at 169, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
13. In those instances where the franchisee has been highly successful, it is
possible that he might be able to wield considerably more bargaining power than in
the normal situation.
14. 20 Utah 2d 352, 437 P.2d 892 (1968).
15. Id. at 353-54, 437 P.2d at 894.
16. See, e.g., Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965).
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franchise. The franchisor controls the site, commissary pur-
chases, purchases from other vendors, method of business
operations, labor practices, quality control, merchandising and
even record keeping. This control is buttressed by the con-
tractual requirement that the franchisee must obey the com-
mands of the Operating Manual."7
Under such an arrangement, the franchisee has no choice but to repose
trust and confidence in the franchisor.
In the Canadian case of Jirna Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada
Ltd.," the court held that the franchisor-franchisee association con-
stituted a fiduciary relationship. The court stated:
[I]t appears to me that the close association of the franchisor
and the franchisee in this case has created what must be con-
strued as a fiduciary relationship and that the actions of the
defendant constitute what can best be described as "construc-
tive fraud."19
Since Jirna is a Canadian decision, it has minimal precedential value.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of that court should apply in a matter of
first impression in this country since several relationships closely resem-
bling a franchise have been held by American courts to be of a fiduciary
nature. These include agencies,2" joint ventures2 and partnerships.22
In Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc.,2" the court recognized the
similarity between an agency and a franchise relationship. The Nichols
court held that when the franchisor's restrictions greatly exceed those
required to protect the trademark, the franchisor is, in effect, the operator
of the business. Accordingly, it was held that an agency relationship
existed between the franchisor and the franchisee.24 Declarations in the
17. BRowN, supra note 1, at 41.
18. 13 D:L.R.3d 645 (Ont. High Ct. J. 1970). Defendant franchisor had made
representations to plaintiff franchisee that as a member of the franchise system,
plaintiff would enjoy "the benefits of volume purchasing." When plaintiff discovered
that defendant was accumulating secret profits because of the volume buying, it
brought the action for an accounting. The court held that because of the fiduciary
relationship, it was improper for defendant to seek and obtain, without any disclosure
to plaintiff, "secret commissions or profits arising out of the purchase of supplies
by the franchises." Id. at 657. A constructive trust was imposed to prevent unjust
enrichment, and the plaintiff was awarded an accounting.
19. Id. at 654.
20. Group Ass'n Plans, Inc. v. Colquhoun, 292 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1968).
21. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
22. Clement v. Clement, 436 Pa. 466, 260 A2d 728 (1970).
23. 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
24. Id. at 616-17, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
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Arthur Murray agreement respecting the nature of the relationship were
deemed not to control.25 The importance of this holding is made manifest
by the fact that standard franchise agreements often contain a provision
stating that "[n]othing herein contained shall be construed so as to
create a partnership, joint venture, or agency between Franchisor and
Franchisee ... "I'
Other arguments can be presented which might bring a franchise
under the classification of a joint venture" or partnership." However,
courts need not torture such analogies. Franchising is unlike any other
legal relationship." It should, therefore, be recognized as a type of
fiduciary relationship based on a set of characteristics peculiar to that
system.
In light of the unique nature of the franchise relationship, imposi-
tion of traditional fiduciary duties would provide an incomplete solution
to the consent clause problem. Under the traditional fiduciary doctrine,
franchisors would be required to act in good faith while franchisees would
not be similarly burdened. Such a situation could encourage franchisors
to install their own managers in the various outlets, thereby destroying a
system which provides the small investor with an opportunity to compete
with corporate giants. A better solution, therefore, would be to establish
a "hybrid" fiduciary relationship, one which imposes the duty of acting
in good faith upon both parties.80
25. Id. at 613, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
26. PRACTISING LAW INsTITUTE, FRANcHISING: TODAY'S LEGAL & BusI Nss
TRENDS 31 (1970).
27. As noted in C. Hmwnr, AuTomoILE FRANcHISING AGREEMENTS 161 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as HEWiTT], some franchise agreements are of one year's duration. A
joint venture is usually formed to carry out a specific venture which, upon completion,
dissolves the relationship. H. HENN, LAw or CORPORATIONS 77-78 (1970) [herein-
after cited as HENNi. The argument would therefore follow that such a franchise
does not represent a continuing relationship but rather a series of one-year ventures.
The breaks during ventures provide a franchisor the opportunity to evaluate his
franchisee's performance before taking him on for another year.
28. The requirements for a partnership, as stated in HEN N, supra note 27, at 46,
are that there be an association of two or more persons carrying on a business (more
than a single venture) as co-owners for profit. The problem with characterizing
franchising as a partnership is illustrated by the Uniform Partnership Act: "Owner-
ship involves the power of ultimate control." UNIFORIM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6(1),
Comment. Accordingly, the franchisor could easily argue that he has so restricted
the transfer of the franchise that the franchisee is not a co-owner and, thus, a partner-
ship does not exist. However, J. CRANE, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 143 (1968), states:
[A limited partnership] consists of (a) general partners, who manage the
business .... and (b) limited partners, who take no part in manage-
ment .
From this description, there would be little difficulty in classifying the franchisor
as a general partner and the franchisee as a limited partner.
29. HEwr, supra note 27, at 195.
30. It might be argued that a termination clause (see text accompanying note
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While the ordinary fiduciary relationship concentrates on the trust
aspect alone, this hybrid relationship would be based on a set of char-
acteristics unique to the franchising system. In addition to the disparity
of bargaining power and trust relationships, this set of characteristics
also includes conflict of interest,"1 a requirement of trademark protec-
tion 2 and certain equitable considerations." This two-way fiduciary
duty would both safeguard each party's economic interests and recognize
that the franchise association is considerably more complex than a simple
fiduciary relationship.
When a court establishes the existence of a fiduciary relationship,
it should have full power to provide relief from all manifestations of
self-preference." The hybrid fiduciary relationship should have a similar
effect. Accordingly, courts should be empowered to deny effect to any
unfair restriction on the right of the franchisee to transfer his license.33
A contract which states that consent to transfer may be arbitrarily
withheld could constitute such an unfair restriction. In addition, the
franchisor's unreasonable refusal to allow the transfer when his consent
is required but no contractual provision is present could afford the
franchisee similar grounds for judicial relief.
Reasonableness Standard
Judicial imposition of a reasonableness standard could also serve to
rectify the consent clause problem. Again, there is a lack of judicial
precedent for such a standard in the consent clause context. However,
courts have imposed a reasonableness standard in cases dealing with
franchise termination clauses.
36 infra) provides adequate relief for the frarichisor whose franchise acts in bad faith.
Thus, the argument might go, the imposition of a fiduciary duty upon the franchisee is
unnecessary. However, the termination is of little help when the franchisor wishes to
retain his franchisee or cannot, merely by termination, undo the harm caused by the
franchisee. In short, the various forms of relief available to the franchisor for a
franchisee's breach of fiduciary duty provide more flexibility than a mere termination
clause.
31. A conflict of interest arises when a franchisee wishes to transfer. The
franchisor's interest in having a transferee buy for the lowest possible price con-
flicts with the franchisee's interest in getting the maximum return on his investment.
Resolution of this conflict in favor of the franchisor is currently assured through his
exercise of the consent clause prerogative.
32. See notes 3-7 supra.
33. A man who has invested a great deal of time and money in establishing
a franchise 'should, as a matter of fairness, be given an opportunity to secure an
adequate return on his investment when he desires to terminate or transfer the
franchise. This element is particularly important to one who has made a lifetime
of the franchise system expecting that he will be treated fairly upon retirement.
34. Brown, Franchising: A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. REv. 650, 670
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Franchising].
35. Id.
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The Seegmiller case concerned an employment agency contract
which permitted the franchisor to terminate the agreement on sixty
days' written notice. The agreement, however, failed to specify whether
termination had to be for cause. Although the court found the particular
termination to be justified, it noted:
[W]hen parties enter into a contract of this character, and
there is no express provision that it may be cancelled without
cause, it seems fair and reasonable to assume that both parties
entered into the arrangement in good faith, intending that if
the service is performed in a satisfactory manner it will not
be cancelled arbitrarily."
The normal understanding is that the franchisee will make a sizable
commitment of time and money to develop and establish the franchise.
The franchisor, however, will also benefit from this investment. In such
circumstances, therefore, the Seegmiller court thought it clearly un-
reasonable for the franchisor to terminate the contract arbitrarily, thereby
compelling the dealer to lose his investment.
This view of termination clauses seems equally applicable to consent
clauses. If there is no provision in the contract which states that consent
to transfer may be withheld arbitrarily, it seems "fair and reasonable"
to assume the parties contracted in good faith and intended that any
denial of consent to transfer be reasonable and for cause. It is no less
unfair for the franchisee to make a substantial commitment to the
franchise and then have his request to transfer to a satisfactory third
party refused than it is to have the franchise unreasonably terminated
after such a commitment. In either situation, the franchisee may be
denied a fair return on his investment.
The reasonableness approach avoids the doctrine-creating device of
the fiduciary analysis. However, it does not lend itself to the situation
where an arbitrary standard of consent is provided in the contract. 7
36. 20 Utah 2d at 354, 437 P.2d at 894 (footnote omitted).
37. Even in the face of the freedom of contract doctrine, it seems incredible that
a court would allow the franchisor to withhold consent on a mere whim. Yet, in
the area of landlord-tenant it is generally accepted that unless prohibited by the
terms of the lease a lessor may arbitrarily withhold consent to assignment of the
lease by the lessee. See Segre v. Ring, 103 N.H. 278, 170 A.2d 265 (1961). Reference
to a lease in the context of a consent clause is appropriate in light of the similarity of
franchisor and lessor interests. In the franchise agreement, the basis for franchisor
control is trademark protection; in a lease, the basis is protection of leased property.
In both situations, the other contracting party is presumably chosen because of
financial position and personality traits which the franchisor or lessor considers
desirable. Although an application of Seegmiller would appear to require reasonableness
when there is no arbitrary standard imposed by the terms of the franchise agreement, the
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Antitrust Approach
A third possible solution to consent clause abuses was originally
presented by ex-FTC Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones:
On the basis of the Schwinn approach, it could be argued
that when a franchisor refuses to allow a reasonable transfer
of the entire license (that is, a transfer of the use of trade
marks, processes, and good will to other franchisees) this may
amount to unlawful restraint."
Under the Schwin. 9 approach to unlawful restraint, a manufacturer
parts with dominion over a product when he parts with title and risk.
His efforts thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the
product may be transferred constitute a per se violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.40
Commissioner Jones seems to have equated "entire license" with
"product" and, therefore, concludes that the franchisor parts with
"dominion" over the "entire license" when the franchise agreement is
consummated. In support of this argument, it has been stated that a
franchisee actually purchases a "package" for marketing a product or
service. 1 The "package," which may include a building, equipment,
supplies and management services, might be said to constitute the
"product" which the franchisor relinquishes when he transfers the
franchise to the franchisee for consideration. This argument, however,
ignores the fact that a substantial part of the license is the trademark
and associated good will, to which the franchisor retains title.
While this antitrust approach might alleviate franchisor abuse of
consent clauses, it could produce another equally serious problem. Com-
missioner Jones has stated that a violation would arise when "a franchisor
refuses to allow a reasonable transfer." Unfortunately, this reasonable-
ness standard does not follow from reliance on the Schwinn approach.
Judicial implementation of a strict Schwinn approach would require a
finding that the franchisor has violated the Sherman Act whenever he
makes an effort to restrict the transfer of the franchise. There is no
allowance for a reasonable refusal. This approach, therefore, would seem
overly harsh since the franchisor is required to exercise control over the
landlord-tenant decisions indicate that courts would not be adverse to upholding an
arbitrary standard should it appear in the agreement.
38. International Franchise Ass'n, Legal Bulletin 7, 1970.
39. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
40. Id. at 382.
41. J. CURRY, PARTNERS FOR PROFIT 18 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CuRRY].
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quality and use of trademarked goods or services. In order to exercise
such control, the franchisor must have the power to prevent transfers
to incompetent or irresponsible transferees.
Commissioner Jones seems to be advocating a modified Schwinn
approach which would permit the franchisor to withhold his consent
reasonably. This antitrust approach would appear to have an advantage
over both the Seegmiller and the hybrid fiduciary approach. By con-
demning all but reasonable restrictions on transfer, the franchisee would
be afforded protection when the franchise agreement contains either an
arbitrary standard of consent or no standard at all.
IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL POSSIBILITIES
All three judicial doctrines would require that the franchisor not
unreasonably withhold his consent to transfer. The next duty facing the
courts, therefore, will be the implementation of this reasonableness
standard in a manner which gives due respect to the interests of both
parties.
The most appropriate method of implementation would appear to
entail a factual, case-by-case analysis rather than the establishment of an
inflexible rule covering all situations." In each case, the defendant
franchisor should bear the burden of showing the reasonableness of his
refusal."3 This method would place the burden on the party with first-
hand knowledge of all the factors going into the decision. Such an
arrangement might also encourage more franchisees to litigate their
42. It might be argued that the franchisee should be required to offer the franchise
to the franchisor before anyone else, at the fair market value. If the franchisor
refuses to buy, the franchisee may sell to whomever he wishes. Such an absolute
rule would seem to insure reasonable refusals since the franchisee would get the fair
market value if the franchisor refuses the transfer. It would also appear to protect the
franchisor's interest since he can always buy if he doesn't trust his franchisee's
ability to judge transferees. This inflexibl rule ignores the situation where a
perfectly competent businessman offers more than the generally accepted fair market
value. Why should the franchisee have to suffer a loss by selling back to the franchisor
at the fair market value, especially since the prospective transferee is capable of
protecting the franchisor's interests? In fact, it is conceivable that the franchisor might
buy the franchise back and then sell to the transferee for a considerable profit. If
this rule were changed so that the franchisee would be required to give the franchisor
the first opportunity to buy at a price equivalent to a bona fide offer made by a
prospective transferee, the problem of concocted offers might arise. This rule would
also be ill-suited for the situation where an incompetent businessman makes a bona fide
offer for a price considerably in excess of the fair market value. Why should the
franchisor, who now must buy the franchise to protect his trademark, have to pay an
inflated price for the franchise?
43. This would be consistent with the characterization of the franchise relation-
ship as fiduciary, for the party accused of securing an advantage for himself has the
burden of proving he did not abuse the trust placed in him. Brown v. Halbert, 271
Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969).
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rights. Presently, franchisees are hesitant to sue because of the high
costs of litigation and the uncertainty of their rights under the franchise
agreement." Requiring the franchisor to prove that his refusal was
reasonable may provide sufficient impetus for franchisees to risk litigation
in the belief that they have a good chance of success.
In attempting to determine whether or not the refusal was reason-
able, the court may look to such factors as the proposed transferee's
intelligence, motivation, education, mechanical aptitude, verbal skill, age,
health, marital status, previous business experience and ability to take
stress." The court may then determine whether or not the potential
transferee met the standard required by the franchisor as to each of
these factors. If he does not, the court may question whether the standard
required of the transferee as to each factor was necessary to protect a
legitimate franchisor interest or whether the franchisor was simply trying
to obtain a "super franchisee." From an evaluation of all these factors,
the courts should be able to give substance to the nebulous term "reason-
able." In making such a decision, the court could consider other factors,
such as high motivation or an excellent business background, which
would mitigate the effect of any unsatisified requirements. In this
manner, the term "reasonable" would take on added meaning.
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
If the courts refuse to require that consent to transfer not be
unreasonably withheld, Congress or the state legislatures could accom-
plish the same objective. In fact, Congress has already attempted to
alleviate certain inequities in the franchise system.
The Federal Automobile Dealers Day-in-Court Act of 195646 was
the first incident of legislative protection of franchises. The Act provides
auto dealers with a cause of action for damages resulting from the
manufacturer's failure "to act in good faith in performing or complying
with any of the terms or provisions of the franchise."47
Subsequent congressional attempts to remedy various franchise
44. Franchising, supra note 34, at 662-63.
45. CuRRY, supra note 41, at 66.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970).
47. By referring to legislative history, the court in Staten Island Motors, Inc.
v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F.Supp. 378 (D.N.J. 1959), interpreted the Act
so as to condemn only franchisor actions accompanied by coercion, intimidation or
threats. Such an interpretation clearly limits the "good faith" standard. Accordingly,
courts have been reluctant to hold auto franchisor refusals to transfer violative of
the Act. See, e.g., Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Mortor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 US. 829 (1962).
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abuses have never been reported out of committee." Paul Rand, former
chairman of the FTC, has perhaps explained Congress' hesistancy to
pass sweeping franchise reform bills:
The many varieties of franchise systems differ among them-
selves so widely that any attempt to state rules applicable to
all franchise systems must either be so broad as to approach
the meaningless or tailored with numerous qualifications in
order to fit all varieties of franchises. It would be foolhardy for
one to issue flat pronouncements declaring the state of the law
as it pertains to franchise agreements."
However, legislation requiring that any denial of consent to transfer
be reasonable, while admittedly broad, would give the courts power to
develop their own criteria, of reasonableness, thereby making such a
broad requisite "meaningful" while eliminating the need for legislative
tailoring of the law "with numerous qualifications."
While Massachusetts has enacted an automobile dealership statute"
similar to the Day-in-Court Act, only Delaware has enacted legislation
covering all franchise relationships.5 ' This Act, however, provides relief
only when the franchisor either has failed to renew or has terminated
the franchise in bad faith." If Delaware's lead is both followed and
expanded, so as to cover consent clause abuses, judicial establishment
of a reasonableness standard will be unnecessary.
While all the suggested judicial approaches to establishing such a
standard have inherent theoretical or practical shortcomings, a statute
need only require that consent to transfer not be unreasonably withheld.
With the aid of such a statute, courts need only implement the law,
instead of creating it.
F. JAMES HELMS
48. See H.R. 2818, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
49. Axelrod, supra note 7, at 712, citing Hearings on S. 2321 Before the Subconin.
on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967).
50. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 93B, § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
51. Dui.. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2551 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
52. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553 (Supp. 1970).
